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Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia: Free Speech Clause
and Establishment Clause Doctrines Work

Together to Protect Individual Thought and
Expression

In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,' the
United States Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of a state
university's refusal to fund a student group's activity based solely on the
group's Christian perspective.2 Respondent, the University of Virginia,
regularly authorizes the payment of the printing bills for various student
publications.3 Upon authorization, the University pays outside printing
contractors directly with money from the Student Activities Fund
("SAF), which is supported by mandatory student fees.4 The purpose
of the SAF is to make available to students a wide range of opportunities
by supporting extracurricular activities that are related to the educational purpose of the University. A student organization must be a
Contracted Independent Organization ("CIO") to receive funding s The
contract between the University and the CIOs states that the University
does not approve of the goals and activities of CIOs and that the
benefits afforded to CIOs should not be "misinterpreted as meaning that
those organizations are part of or controlled by the University."7 The
University further disclaims responsibility for CIOs by requiring that the
organizations include a clause in all written materials stating that they
are independent of the University.' CIOs may apply for publication

1.

115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).

2. Id. at 2513.
3. Id. at 2514.
4. Id. Students must pay fourteen dollars per semester to fund student activities
through the SAF. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Such benefits include use of University facilities and the possible opportunity
to receive SAF funding. Id.
8. Id.

663

664

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

funding if they qualify as one of eleven categories of student groups.
SAF guidelines prohibit the funding of "religious activities," defined as
any activity that "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f]
in or about a deity or an ultimate reality."" Petitioner Rosenberger's
organization, Wide Awake Productions ("WAP"), qualified as a CIO and
was eligible to apply for SAP funding under the category of "student
news, information, opinion, entertainment, or academic communications
media groups."" WAP publishes a paper called "Wide Awake: A
Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia."" The paper's
purpose is to "publish a magazine of philosophical and religious
expression, to facilitate discussion which fosters an atmosphere of
sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints, and to provide a
unifying focus for Christians of multicultural background.""3 WAP
applied to the SAF for payment of its printing bills, but the SAF refused
to fund WAP's publication based upon its finding that the paper was a
"religious activity." 4 After making the proper appeals through the
University,15 WAP filed suit against the University alleging that the
SAF guideline restricting funding for "religious activities" violated its
rights to free speech, press, and exercise of religion. 6 The District
Court for the Western District of Virginia found for the University and
held that the University's guideline did not discriminate against either
the content or viewpoint of student speech and that the University's
Establishment Clause concern over "religious activities" justified the
denial of funding to WA. 7 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the SAF guideline did, in fact, discriminate against speech content,
but affirmed the district court because of a "compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and state.""8 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 9 The'Court held (1)

9. Id.
10. Id. at 2514-15.
11. Id. at 2517-18.
12. Id. at 2515.
13. Id. The editors' mission is to challenge Christians to live according to their faith
and "to encourage students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ
means." Articles in the magazine cover various topics including eating disorders, racism,
crisis pregnancy, and professor profiles. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The Appropriation Committee of the Student Council makes the initial
decisions regarding disbursement of SAF support. Appeals are taken by the full Student
Council and then the Student Activities Committee. Id.
16. Id. at 2515-16.
17. 795 F. Supp. 175, 183 (W.D. Va. 1992).
18. 18 F.3d 269, 281 (4th Cir. 1994).
19. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
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the SAF Guideline discriminated against private speech based on its
viewpoint,2" and (2) such aiscrimination was not justified by an
Establishment Clause concern because the University's program, absent
the discriminatory aspect, was neutral toward religion.2 1
The Supreme Court has rendered numerous decisions based on the
interpretation of these important words in American jurisprudence:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech."22 The Court has interpreted the Free Speech Clause to protect
both the content and the viewpoint of private speech. In Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley,'m the Court struck a city's ordinance
which allowed peaceful picketing on the subject of a school's labormanagement dispute but prohibited all other peaceful picketing.24 The
Court held that the ordinance violated citizens' rights to free speech:
"[Glovernment may not grant the use of a foram to people whose views
it finds acceptable but deny use to those wishing to express less favored
or more controversial views."2 More recently, in Perry EducationAss'n
v. Perry Local Educators'Ass'n,2" the Court summarized the development of the forum analysis approach to free speech issues with four
rules of law. First, in natural public forums, such as streets and parks,
government regulation of the content of private speech must serve a
compelling state interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve that
interest.27 Second, the content of private speech in a public forum
created by the government, such as a school, receives the same
constitutional protection as private speech in natural public fora.2"
Third, the government may regulate the content of private speech in a
nonpublic forum in order to serve the purpose for which the forum was

20. Id. at 2520.
21. Id. at 2525.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment is applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
23. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).

24.
25.
26.
system

Id. at 95.
Id.
460 U.S. 37 (1983). In Perry, the Educators' Association opened its intermail
to the Perry Education Association ("PEA7). As the newly-elected and sole

representative of teachers, PEAs exclusive access negated prior access rights of a rival

union. Id. at 38. The court held the Educators' Association had created a non-public forum
and thus had the right to make distinctions in access based on subject matter and identity.
Id. at 48.
27. Id. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 477 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).

28. Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
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created.2 9 Fourth, the government may never regulate speech, in any
type of forum, based on the viewpoint of such speech.'0 The Court
analyzed private student speech in a public forum created by the
government in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District." In Tinker, the Court held that the viewpoints of high school
students were protected by the First Amendment, and thus, the public
school's prohibition of black armbands worn in protest of the Vietnam
Conflict was unconstitutional. 2 Three years later, the Court clearly
interpreted the First Amendment to protect the rights of student speech
on state university campuses.
The United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause, began in Everson v. Board
of Education of Ewing Township." The Court articulated a neutrality
test in Everson: On one hand "the clause ... was intended to erect 'a
wall of separation between Church and State'"; on the other hand
"other language of the amendment commands that the [State] cannot
hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion."' Until
the early 1970's, this fact-sensitive neutrality test dominated Establishment Clause analysis.3 7 In 1971, a three-part test, articulated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman3 replaced the neutrality test. Under the Lemon
test, an Establishment Clause violation occurs if the act at issue (1) has
a nonsecular purpose, (2) has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting

29. Id. at 46 (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114
(1981)).
30. Id.
31. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
32. Id. at 505-06.
33. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). Justice Powell wrote, "[the vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools."' Id. (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
34. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

35. Id. at 16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
36. Id
37. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a city ordinance that allowed
public schools to release students during school hours to attend off-campus religious
training sessions); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)

(holding that a state law requiring classes to begin each day with readings from the Bible
was not neutral toward religion and thus unconstitutional).
38. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The three-part test comprised three prior cases decided by the
Court: McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (holding a state's Sunday closing laws

were valid because the laws served a secular purpose of providing a uniform day of rest);
Schernpp, 374 U.S. 203 (holding that reading the Bible at the opening of each school day

violated the Establishment Clause because it had the primary effect of advancing religion);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (holding that a state law granting tax
exemptions to religious properties was valid because the law did not lead to "excessive
entanglement" with religion).
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religion, or (3) fosters an excessive entanglement with religion. 9
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been uncertain since the
introduction of this test Many decisions resulting from its application
have been inconsistent. 40 For example, the Court in Lemon, cited with
approval the decision in Board of Education v. Allen,41 which held that
a law providing for the loan of state-supplied textbooks to parochial
schools did not violate the Establishment Clause. 42 The Court applied
the Lemon test in a subsequent case and reached a decision that seemed
inconsistent with Allen; the Court held in Meek v. Pittenger" that
provision of state personnel and equipment to parochial schools violated
the Establishment Clause. Not only has the Lemon test resulted in
inconsistencies as applied, but the Court has also rendered the test
inconsistent on its face by choosing to apply it in some Establishment
Clause cases and completely ignoring the test in others.44 Lemon's
validity has been further undermined by appeals for the adoption of new
tests to analyze Establishment Clause cases in concurring and dissenting
opinions.'
The Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause
have come together in at least two important cases in recent years. In
Widmar v. Vincent,4" the University of Missouri regularly opened its
facilities to registered student groups for activity use.47 The University
denied such use to a registered religious group when it passed a
regulation that prohibited use of school facilities for "purposes of
religious worship or religious teaching."4 The Court held that religious
worship and discussion are protected by the First Amendment and
applied the forum analysis doctrine articulated in Perry.49 Since the
University had created a forum generally open for use by student

39. 403 U.S. at 612.
40. See School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
41. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
42. 403 U.S. at 612.
43. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
44. The Court ignored the Lemon test in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)
(holding that the government sponsorship of a legislative chaplain did not violate the

Establishment Clause because the framers of the Constitution did not find such funding
unconstitutional).
45. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)

(concurring with the majority that a city-owned nativity scene affixed to public property
at Christmas did not violate the Establishment Clause because the city did not intend to
endorse any message of Christianity).
46. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
47. Id. at 265.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 269-70.
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groups, the State had to prove that the content discrimination was
necessary to serve a compelling state interest. The Court held that
compliance with the United States Constitution is a compelling state
interest, but the University in Widmar would not violate the Establishment Clause by adopting an equal access policy. 0 A similar case,
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,5
involved a school regulation denying facility use to any group for
religious purposes, but permitting use for "social and civic" meetings.52
Lamb's Chapel, a religious group, requested permission to use the
school's facilities to show a film about child-rearing, but the request was
denied because the film was "church-related.5
The Court held that
the school, as a nonpublic forum, denied access to a group that would
otherwise be eligible based on the content of its speech, solely because
of that group's viewpoint.54 This, the Court held, violated the Free
Speech Clause. The Court rejected the state's theory in Lamb's Chapel
that compliance with the Establishment Clause justified violation of
rights to free speech. 5 The recent case law addressing free speech in
schools and establishment of religion, combined, with the uncertainty of
future Establishment Clause doctrine, set the stage for the importance
of the decision in Rosenberger. Many scholars hoped that the Court
would take the opportunity to clarify whether the Lemon test or another
test governs Establishment Clause analysis. Others anxiously waited
to see how the Court would handle a purported conflict between two
clauses of the First Amendment.5 7
The Supreme Court, in the five to four decision in Rosenberger, held
that the University violated the First Amendment rights of students by
50. Id. at 271-72. The Court applied the Lemon test and found no Establishment
Clause violation where a school provides equal access to campus facilities for group
activities. Id.
51. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
52. Id. at 2144. A religious group petitioned the school for use of its facilities in order
to show a film on child-rearing from a Christian viewpoint. Similar use had been
permitted for nonsectarian groups. Id.
53. Id. at 2144-45.
54. Id. at 2147. The Court found that the school had, in fact, created an open public
forum, but applied the nonpublic forum analysis as it was more favorable to the State. Id.
55. Id. at 2148. The Court applied both the Lemon and endorsement tests to reach this
conclusion.
56. Jay Alan Sekulow et al., Religious Freedom and the First Self.Evident Truth:
Equality as a Guiding Principlein Interpretingthe Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 351 (Summer 1995); Recent Cases, Fourth Circuit Upholds University's Refusal to
ConsiderReligious Organizationsfor Student Acitvities Funding, 108 HARV. L. REV. 507,
510 (1994).
57. Sekulow, supra note 56; Annual Fourth Circuit Review, 52 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
471, 575 (1995).
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denying their funding request for a publication solely because the
students' printed speech contained a Christian perspective.5' This
landmark case was decided primarily on the basis of free speech law. 9
The most important factor in the Court's analysis was the distinction
between private and government speech. 6° The University made
student funds available to pay the printing expenses of student
publications to facilitate student speech; the Court found that the
publications constituted private citizens' speech rather than government
speech.61 The contract between the CIOs and the University disclaiming endorsement or responsibility for CIO goals or activities was very
important in this finding.62 The Court found the University's actions
created a limited forum for private speech in a "metaphysical sense."6
Such a forum is protected by the First Amendment, and the University
violated that protection by prohibiting speech based on a particular
viewpoint." SAF Guidelines did not exclude the subject matter of
religion, and WAP's paper was eligible for funding under the publications category."' The University's sole basis for the denial was the
The Court compared
classification of WAP as a "religious activity.'
the forum of "student funds" in Rosenbergerto the forum of "facility use"
in Lamb's Chapel: in both cases religious groups met the subject matter
requirements for gaining access to limited forums; in both cases religious
groups were denied access to forums because the subjects were displayed
from a religious viewpoint.6 7 In holding that the University violated
students' rights to free speech by prohibiting funding for "religious
activities," the Court stressed the importance of individual thought and
The Court then
expression, especially in a university setting.'
analyzed Rosenberger under Establishment Clause doctrine69 by
applying a neutrality test. 71 Under the doctrine of neutrality, both the

purpose of the government action and the details of the government's
58. 115 S. Ct. at 2520.
59. Id.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 2519.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2517.
Id at 2518.
Id. at 2517-18.
Id. at 2517. "Religious activity" is defined as any activity that "primarily promotes
or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality." Id. at 2515.
67. Id. at 2518.
68. Id. at 2520 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972)).
69. Id. at 2521. The dissent would have affirmed the Fourth Circuit based on a
violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2533 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70. 115 S. Ct. at 2521.
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program must be neutral toward religion.7 The Supreme Court found
that the purpose of the SAF was to open a forum for private speech and72
to support various student groups, including publication groups.
There was no indication that the University's purpose in disbursing
funds to student groups was to advance religion.7" Had the University
granted funding, it would not have done so because of WAP's religious
perspective but, instead, because WAP fell into the category of "student
news, information, opinion, entertainment, or academic communications
media groups. " '
Therefore, the Court held that the University's
purpose was neutral toward religion."5 The Court next analyzed the
details of the SAF program and found that it too was neutral toward
religion.7 6 Most important in this finding were the steps that the
University took to disassociate itself from both the goals and activities
of the ClOs and any written materials published by such groups.77
The Court alluded to two tests that have played a part in the uncertain
history of Establishment Clause doctrine, the endorsement and coercion
tests: "[Tihere is no real likelihood that the speech in question is being
either endorsed or coerced by the State." 8 Finding both the purpose
and the details of the SAF program neutral toward religion, the Court
held that the Free Speech violation was not justified by fears that the
Establishment Clause would be violated if publications with a religious
viewpoint were funded through mandatory student fees.79 In fact, the
Court suggested that upholding the University's action would not only
violate individuals' rights to free speech, but it may also violate the
Establishment Clause itself by risking the "fostering [of] a pervasive bias
or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the
Establishment Clause requires. There is no Establishment Clause
violation in the University's honoring its duties under the Free Speech
Clause."'

71. Id.

72. Id. at 2522.
73. Id.
74. Id. In the 1990 school year, WAP was one of fifteen groups to qualify under this
category. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2523.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2525. Justice O'Connor predictably wrote a concurring opinion in which she
advocated her own two-part test for Establishment Clause cases involving public funding:
(1) the government action must be neutral toward religion and (.2) the facts of the case
must result in the conclusion that the government is not endorsing religion. Id. at 2526
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
80. 115 S. Ct. at 2525.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Rosenberger is important in the
development of First Amendment jurisprudence.' First, the decision
reinforces the strength and validity of the Free Speech Clause. By
reversing the Fourth Circuit's holding that free speech rights must be
sacrificed for the sake of separation of church and state, the Supreme
Court in Rosenberger restored a logical principle: The Establishment
Clause does not trump the Free Speech Clause; the two clauses are
designed to work together to protect individual thought and expression."' Under the Court's analysis, if the circumstances clearly indicate
that a private citizen is speaking, rather than government, the
Establishment Clause has not been violated because the government
must be speaking for the wall separating church and state to crumble.8 2
This analysis promotes one of the most important aspects of American
society-the marketplace of ideas." When a state entity opens a public
forum such as the Student Activities Fund to encourage the exchange of
private thoughts and expressions, that state entity should not have the
authority to "define [religious viewpoints] out of the marketplace of
ideas."84 The decision in Rosenberger is important to First Amendment
jurisprudence for a second reason. The Court's analysis of the Establish85
ment Clause issue illustrates the continued demise of the Lemon test.
The Court's opinion completely ignored the Lemon test, even though the
Fourth Circuit based its finding of an Establishment Clause violation
M But even though Rosenberger added
upon a Lemon analysis."
to the
line of cases which seem to invalidate Lemon, this recent Court did not
take yet another opportunity to articulate a clear test for Establishment
Clause problems. Thus, lower courts are left in the same pool of
uncertainty that existed prior to Rosenberger.7 Lower courts might
interpret Rosenbergerto mandate use of the neutrality test only in cases
where student activity fees at universities are used to support services
for student organizations.8 8 In other cases with dissimilar facts, lower

81. See Herman Schwartz, When Speech is Religious, Doctrines May Clash, NEW JER.
LJ., Aug. 28, 1995.
82. 115 S. Ct. at 2525.
83. Sekulow, supra note 56.
84. Id.
85. Daniel B. Kohrman & Kathryn M. Woodruff, The 1994-95 Term of the UnitedStates
Supreme Court and its Impact on PuSlic Schools, 102 EDuc. LAW REP., Oct, 1995, at 421.
86. 18 F.3d 269 (1994).
87. Ralph D. Mawdsley, Lamb's ChapelRevisited: A Mixed Message on Establishment
of Religion, Forum and Free Speech, 101 EDUC. LAW REP. 531 (1995).
88. Mawdsley, supra note 87; Marcia Coyle, Although the Center Waved, the Court's
Rulings Had a Big Effect on Race, Religion, and Federalism, NATL L.J., July 31, 1995.
Both the majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's opinion contained language which
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courts will be forced to choose between the mirage of Establishment
Clause tests that have colored judicial history for the past twenty
years.8 9 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's use of the neutrality test in
Rosenberger symbolized a retreat to the common-sense principles that
existed prior to Lemon:90 The First Amendment requires "the state to
be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the state to be their adversary."9' The
neutrality doctrine supplements forum analysis when private speech is
religious to prevent the government from regulating speech based on its
religious viewpoint. As Rosenberger illustrates, the two doctrines work
together, resulting in a neutral government which permits various and
unlimited views to enter the marketplace of ideas. Whether this concept
of neutrality will continue to prevail in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is uncertain. Perhaps the answer will be revealed the next time
the Supreme Court has an opportunity to overrule Lemon.
ELIZABETH M. WHEELER

suggested that the rule of Rosenbergeris limited. First the majority declined to establish
a new test for Establishment Clause problems and stressed the importance of free
expression in Universities. Second, Justice O'Connor focused on the importance of the factspecific characteristic of the test in Rosenberger.
89. Mawdsley, supra note 87.
90. Sekulow, supra note 56.
91. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.

